Accounting for Systemic Risk in Analysis of Crisis Scenarios

Abstract

Systemic risk is ubiquitous in our increasingly globalised world owing to the interconnections within and across sectors. However, a review of National Risk Assessments performed in OECD member countries reveals that systemic risk is rarely mentioned, and it is never accounted for in those assessments. A powerful method accounts for systemic risk and identifies mitigating strategies using participatory modelling with stakeholders: strategy mapping with Strategyfinder. The risk model is represented as a directed graph consisting of risk nodes and directed edges (arrows) expressing causal influences. The method originated in the management of large, complex projects, and it has been applied to systemic risks in critical infrastructures and pandemics. We demonstrate the Strategyfinder method using a scenario describing a cyberattack on electronic communication infrastructure leading to serious consequences for health and lives. The scenario is borrowed from the report Analysis of Risk Scenarios by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection.